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Abstract
For an investor with constant absolute risk aversion and a long horizon, who trades in a
market with constant investment opportunities and small proportional transaction costs, we
obtain explicitly the optimal investment policy, its implied welfare, liquidity premium, and
trading volume. We identify these quantities as the limits of their isoelastic counterparts for
high levels of risk aversion. The results are robust with respect to finite horizons, and extend
to multiple uncorrelated risky assets.
In this setting, we study a Stackelberg equilibrium, led by a risk-neutral, monopolistic market
maker who sets the spread as to maximize profits. The resulting endogenous spread depends
on investment opportunities only, and is of the order of a few percentage points for realistic
parameter values.
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1 Introduction
Despite their singular behavior, investors with constant absolute risk aversion are familiar figures
in financial economics, thanks to their tractable character. Such investors, defined by exponential
utility functions, are indeed peculiar for both portfolios and prices. With constant investment
opportunities, they insist on keeping in risky assets a fixed amount of money, regardless of their
wealth. If asked to price a claim, their answer depends neither on wealth, nor on risk aversion.
Consuming over time, they do not disdain negative consumption, especially at later dates. Yet,
their actions are often easier to grasp than the proper but impenetrable behavior of isoelastic
investors.1 Hence, exponential utility remains a central tool to glean insights from complex models,
such as the ones with frictions.
This paper examines the implications of exponential utility for long-run portfolio choice with
small transaction costs. For an exponential investor, with constant investment opportunities and a
long planning horizon, we find the optimal trading policy, its welfare, the liquidity premium, and
trading volume. We then allow a risk neutral, monopolistic market maker to set the spread as to
maximize profits, obtaining an endogenous spread that depends on investment opportunities alone.
Our analysis leads to new economic implications, and sheds new light on existing results. We
find that investing optimally on a long horizon is equivalent to receiving, over the same period,
a fixed equivalent annuity, found explicitly, which does not depend on the horizon. This fact is
well-known in the frictionless case, but fails for transaction costs with a finite horizon, due to the
spurious effects of portfolio set-up and liquidation. As in the isoelastic case, transaction costs entail
a small reduction in the equivalent annuity.
The equivalent annuity, trading boundaries, and absolute turnover are inversely proportional
to risk aversion, as in the frictionless case, while relative turnover and the liquidity premium
are independent of risk aversion. We identify all these quantities as the limits of their isoelastic
counterparts, as relative risk aversion becomes large. This result suggests that exponential utility
is a useful tool to study isoelastic investors with high risk aversion.
Our results are robust to finite horizons and to several assets. For a finite horizon, we derive
bounds on the investor’s certainty equivalent, whose time average converges to the equivalent
annuity. In a market with several uncorrelated assets, one-dimensional trading policies remain
optimal, leading to the same liquidity premia and trading volumes, while equivalent annuities add
in the cross section.
Finally, we endogenize the spread by allowing a risk-neutral, monopolistic market maker to fix
it to maximize expected profits. Unlike the investor, whose policy and welfare depend on the bid
and ask prices alone, the market maker’s profits depend on the book price, which lies within the
bid-ask spread, and represents the price at which the market maker’s inventory is valued. The
resulting endogenous spread is independent of risk aversion, and hence depends only on investment
opportunities, and on the book price. When the latter is chosen close to the ask price, realistic
values of investment opportunities lead to spreads of a few percentage points.
Our results also have novel mathematical implications. We obtain new finite-horizon bounds,
which measure the monetary value of investment opportunities for an exponential investor, and are
expressed in terms of the risk neutral probability. For isoelastic investors, such bounds involve the
myopic probability, under which a hypothetical logarithmic investor adopts the same policy as the
original investor under the physical probability. Thus, for exponential investors, the risk neutral
probability plays a similar role as the myopic probability for isoelastic investors. This analogy is
central to obtain a new kind of verification theorem, which stems from the finite-horizon bounds.
1An isoelastic investor is one with constant relative risk aversion, i.e. with either power of logarithmic utility.
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Our paper touches on three main strands of literature: asymptotics, shadow prices, and expo-
nential utility. Our contribution to asmptotics is to prove the first rigorous expansions for small
transaction costs and exponential utility, complementing the heuristics of Whalley and Wilmott
(1997), Mokkhavesa and Atkinson (2002), and Goodman and Ostrov (2010), as well as results for
the isoelastic case, cf. Shreve and Soner (1994), Rogers (2004), Janecˇek and Shreve (2004), Ger-
hold, Muhle-Karbe and Schachermayer (2010b,a), and Bichuch (2012). Our solution is based on
shadow prices, as in the recent papers Kallsen and Muhle-Karbe (2010); Gerhold, Muhle-Karbe
and Schachermayer (2010b,a); Gerhold, Guasoni, Muhle-Karbe and Schachermayer (2011); Her-
czegh and Prokaj (2011); Choi, Sirbu and Zˇitkovic´ (2012).
More broadly, our results are relevant for the literature on exponential utility with transaction
costs, both in the context of portfolio choice (Mokkhavesa and Atkinson, 2002; Liu, 2004; Goodman
and Ostrov, 2010) and of option pricing (Davis, Panas and Zariphopoulou, 1993; Whalley and
Wilmott, 1997; Barles and Soner, 1998). In contrast to these papers, we remove consumption and
random endowment from our model, focusing instead on long-horizon asymptotics for tractability.
This approach is common for isoelastic utilities (Taksar, Klass and Assaf, 1988; Dumas and Luciano,
1991; Gerhold, Muhle-Karbe and Schachermayer, 2010b). Unaccountably, it seems unexplored in
the exponential class. Our analysis of endogenous spreads is closest to the work of Luciano (2011) on
equilibrium between isoelastic investors and dealers, with the difference that we pair an exponential
investor with a risk-neutral dealer.
Finally, this paper on constant absolute risk aversion complements the analysis of constant
relative risk aversion in Gerhold, Guasoni, Muhle-Karbe and Schachermayer (2011) (henceforth
GGMKS). To facilitate comparison, the main results in both papers are stated in the same format
and with the same notation. Yet, each paper addresses a different set of implications, which is
specific to the preference class considered.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and our main results.
Their main implications are discussed in Section 3. The main results are first derived informally in
Section 4, then proved in Section 5.
2 Model and Main Result
2.1 Market
The market has a safe asset S0t = 1 and a risky asset, trading at ask (buying) price S. The bid
(selling) price is S(1−ε), hence ε ∈ (0, 1) is the relative bid-ask spread. Denoting by W a standard
Brownian motion, the ask price S follows
dSt/St = µdt+ σdWt,
where µ > 0 is the expected excess return and σ > 0 is the volatility. The mean-variance ratio
µ¯ = µ/σ2 turns out to be a key parameter in the solution.
A self-financing trading strategy is an R2-valued predictable process (ϕ0, ϕ) of finite variation:
(ϕ00−, ϕ0−) = (ξ0, ξ) ∈ R2 represents the initial positions (in units) in the safe and risky asset, and
ϕ0t and ϕt denote the positions held at time t ≥ 0. Writing ϕt = ϕ↑t − ϕ↓t as the difference between
the cumulative number of shares bought (ϕ↑t ) and sold (ϕ
↓
t ) by time t, the self-financing condition
dictates that the cash balance ϕ0 changes only due to trading activity in the number of shares ϕ:
dϕ0t = −Stdϕ↑t + (1− ε)Stdϕ↓t .
3
Trading strategies are further restricted from unlimited borrowing by the following admissibility
condition, which rules out doubling strategies:2
Definition 2.1. A self-financing strategy (ϕ0, ϕ) is admissible if the risky position ϕS is a.s.
uniformly bounded.
The liquidation value of the wealth associated to an admissible strategy is denoted by
ΞϕT = ϕ
0
T + ϕ
+
T (1− ε)ST − ϕ−T ST .
2.2 Preferences
An investor with constant absolute risk aversion α > 0, which corresponds to the exponential utility
function U(x) = −e−αx, maximizes the certainty equivalent U−1(E[U(Ξ)]), which for exponential
utility reduces to:
− 1
α
logE
[
e−αΞ
ϕ
T
]
.
In a market with constant investment opportunities, the certainty equivalent increases linearly with
the horizon. Hence, we focus on the certainty equivalent per unit of time, which is the same as a
fixed annuity.
Definition 2.2. A strategy (ϕ0, ϕ) is long-run optimal if it maximizes the equivalent annuity
EAϕα = lim inf
T→∞
− 1
αT
logE
[
e−αΞ
ϕ
T
]
. (2.1)
EAα = maxϕ EA
ϕ
α denotes the maximal equivalent annuity.
2.3 Main Result
The next theorem contains our main results. Recall that µ¯ = µ/σ2 is the mean-variance ratio.
Theorem 2.3. An investor with constant absolute risk aversion α > 0 trades to maximize the
equivalent annuity. Then, for a small bid-ask spread ε > 0:
i) (Equivalent Annuity)
For the investor, trading the risky asset with transaction costs is equivalent to leaving all wealth
in the safe asset, while receiving the equivalent annuity (the gap λ¯ is defined in iv) below):
EAα = σ
2β¯ =
σ2
2α
(µ¯2 − λ¯2).
ii) (Liquidity Premium)
Trading the risky asset with transaction costs is equivalent to trading a hypothetical asset,
at no transaction costs, with the same volatility σ, but with a lower expected excess return
σ2
√
µ¯2 − λ¯2. Thus, the liquidity premium is
LiPr = σ2
(
µ¯−
√
µ¯2 − λ¯2
)
.
2The definition of admissibility given here is sufficient to guarantee an interior solution in our setting, and has
a clear interpretation. In more abstract models, admissibility is typically defined in terms of pricing measures, cf.
Delbaen et al. (2002); Kabanov and Stricker (2002); Schachermayer (2003).
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iii) (Trading Policy)
It is optimal to keep the value of the risky position within the buy and sell boundaries
ηα− =
µ¯− λ¯
α
, ηα+ =
µ¯+ λ¯
α
,
where ηα− and ηα+ are evaluated at ask and bid prices, respectively.
iv) (Gap)
The gap λ¯ is the unique value for which the solution of the initial value problem
w′(y)− w(y)2 + (2µ¯− 1)w(y)− (µ¯− λ¯)(µ¯+ λ¯) = 0
w(0) = µ¯− λ¯,
also satisfies the terminal value condition
w
(
log
(
u(λ¯)
l(λ¯)
))
= µ¯+ λ¯, where u(λ¯) =
µ¯+ λ¯
(1− ε)α and l(λ¯) =
µ¯− λ¯
α
.
In view of the explicit formula for w(y, λ¯) in Lemma 5.1 below, this is a scalar equation for λ¯.
v) (Trading Volume)
Let µ 6= σ2/2.3 Then, relative turnover, defined as shares traded d||ϕ||t divided by shares held
|ϕt|, has long-term average
ShTu = lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
d‖ϕ‖t
|ϕt| =
σ2
2
(
1− 2µ¯
(u(λ¯)/l(λ¯))1−2µ¯ − 1 +
2µ¯− 1
(u(λ¯)/l(λ¯))2µ¯−1 − 1
)
.
Absolute turnover, defined as value of wealth traded, has long term-average:4
WeTuα = lim
T→∞
1
T
(∫ T
0
(1− ε)Stdϕ↓t +
∫ T
0
Stdϕ
↑
t
)
=
σ2
2
(
ηα+(1− 2µ¯)
(u(λ¯)/l(λ¯))1−2µ¯ − 1 +
ηα−(2µ¯− 1)
(u(λ¯)/l(λ¯))2µ¯−1 − 1
)
.
vi) (Asymptotics)
The following expansions in terms of the bid-ask spread ε hold:5
λ¯ =
(
3
4
µ¯2
)1/3
ε1/3 +O(ε).
EAα =
σ2
2α
(
µ¯2 −
(
3
4
µ¯2
)2/3
ε2/3 +O(ε4/3)
)
.
LiPr =
σ2
2µ¯
(
3
3
µ¯2
)2/3
ε2/3 +O(ε4/3).
ηα± =
1
α
(
µ¯±
(
3
4
µ¯2
)1/3
ε1/3 +O(ε)
)
.
ShTu =
σ2
2
µ¯
(
3
4
µ¯2
)−1/3
ε−1/3 +O(ε1/3).
3The special case µ = σ2/2 leads to analogous results, see GGMKS, Lemma D.2.
4The number of shares is written as the difference ϕt = ϕ
↑
t −ϕ↓t of cumulative shares bought and sold, and wealth
is evaluated at trading prices, i.e., at the bid price (1− ε)St when selling, and at the ask price St when buying.
5Algorithmic calculations can deliver terms of arbitrarily high order.
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WeTuα =
2σ2
3α
(
3
4
µ¯2
)2/3
ε−1/3 +O(ε1/3).
The proof of Theorem 2.3 exploits the construction of a shadow price, i.e., a fictitious risky asset
evolving within the bid-ask spread, which is equivalent to the transaction cost market in terms of
both welfare and the optimal policy. This is the approach used for power utility by Gerhold,
Guasoni, Muhle-Karbe and Schachermayer (2011).
Theorem 2.4 (Shadow price). The policy in Theorem 2.3 iii) and the equivalent annuity in The-
orem 2.3 i) are also optimal for a frictionless risky asset with shadow price S˜, which always lies
within the bid-ask spread, and coincides with the trading price at times of trading for the optimal
policy. The shadow price follows
dS˜t/S˜t = µ˜(Υt)dt+ σ˜(Υt)dWt.
for deterministic functions µ˜(·) and σ˜(·) given explicitly in Lemma 5.6. The state variable Υt =
log(ϕtSt/l(λ¯)) represents the centered logarithm of the risky position, which is a Brownian motion
with drift reflected to remain in the interval [0, log(u(λ¯)/l(λ¯))], i.e.,
dΥt = (µ− σ2/2)dt+ σdWt + dLt − dUt.
Here, Lt and Ut are nondecreasing processes, corresponding to the relative purchases and sales,
respectively (cf. Lemma 5.9).6 In the interior of the no-trade region, i.e., when the risky position
lies in (l(λ¯), u(λ¯)), the numbers of units of the safe and risky asset are constant, and the state
variable Υt follows Brownian motion with drift. When Υt reaches the boundary of the no-trade
region, buying or selling takes place so as to keep it within [l(λ), u(λ)].
3 Implications and Applications
Theorem 2.3 presents both analogies with and departures from the isoelastic case in GGMKS.
One analogy is that the trading policy depends on the market only through the mean-variance
ratio µ¯. All other quantities also only depend on µ¯ in business time, i.e., when measured with
respect to the clock τ = σ2t running at the speed of the market’s variance. Measured in usual
calendar time t, they scale linearly with the market’s variance σ2.
In a departure from power utility, the gap λ¯ is independent of the investor’s risk aversion α here.
Hence, the liquidity premium and relative turnover are also common to all investors with constant
absolute risk aversion. The equivalent annuity and trading boundaries, however, are inversely
proportional to risk aversion, as in the frictionless case, and so is absolute turnover.
Further, in this model a strategy of full investment in the risky asset is never optimal, regardless
of the risk aversion α, and the only solution without trading obtains with a null risk premium µ¯ = 0.
The absence of full risky investment is a consequence of constant trading boundaries in terms of
monetary amounts rather than fractions of wealth.
In spite of these differences, the model- and preference-free relationships for power utilities
(GGMKS, Section 3.5) carry over to the exponential case. For example, the universal relation
LiPr ≈ 3
4
εShTu,
6The increasing processes Lt and Ut are explicitly identified by the double Skorokhod map in a finite interval, see
Kruk, Lehoczky, Ramanan and Shreve (2007).
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between the liquidity premium LiPr, the spread ε, and the relative turnover ShTu remains valid
for exponential utilities. Thus, this relation not only holds both across market and preference
parameters, but is also the same for both families.
3.1 Trading Policy and Average Risky Position.
In analogy with the isoelastic case, the optimal policy is to keep the risky position between two
boundaries. Unlike the isoelastic case, but as in the frictionless setting, trading boundaries are
measured not as fractions of wealth, but as monetary amounts. The novelty is that these boundaries
are symmetric around the frictionless optimum. In apparent contrast, Liu (2004) finds numerically
that average risky holdings (over the investment period) increase with transaction costs, suggesting
that more transaction costs reduce an investor’s effective risk aversion. In fact, our results are
consistent with his findings, once we observe that, if the risk premium is large enough, the risky
position is on average closer to the sell than to the buy boundary, even as the boundaries are
equidistant from the frictionless solution at the order ε2/3. To see this, it suffices to calculate the
average risky position, using the stationary distribution of the reflected geometric Brownian motion
Yt = ϕtSt = le
Υt :
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
Ytdt =
∫ log u/l
0
ley
2µ¯− 1
(u(λ¯)/l(λ¯))2µ¯−1 − 1e
(2µ¯−1)ydy =
µ¯− 12
µ¯
(u(λ¯)/l(λ¯))2µ¯ − 1
(u(λ¯)/l(λ¯))2µ¯−1 − 1 .
To obtain an asymptotic expansion for small transaction costs, recall that l(λ¯) = (µ¯ − λ¯)/α and
u(λ¯) = (µ¯+ λ¯)/(1− ε)α. Then, the expansion for λ¯ yields:
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
Ytdt =
µ¯
α
(
1 +
µ¯− 1
61/3µ¯2/3
ε2/3 +O(ε)
)
. (3.1)
As a result, for µ¯ > 1 the average risky position tends to be higher than the frictionless value µ¯/α,
and vice versa for µ¯ < 1. This effect is entirely due to the skewness of the stationary distribution
towards the upper boundary, because the boundaries (µ¯± λ)/α are symmetric around µ¯/α at the
order ε2/3. Thus, the estimator αˆ obtained by comparing the average risky holding in (3.1) to the
frictionless formula µ¯/αˆ is given by:
αˆ = α
(
1− µ¯− 1
61/3µ¯2/3
ε2/3 +O(ε)
)
(3.2)
This estimator underestimates true risk aversion for µ¯ > 1, with larger transaction costs leading
to a larger bias, and explains the observation of Liu (2004) that transaction costs seem to reduce
effective risk aversion.
3.2 Convergence and High Risk Aversion Asymptotics
The formulas in Theorem 2.3 for exponential utilities are closely related to the limits of the corre-
sponding isoelastic quantities in GGMKS. The next result makes this relation precise, and justifies
the dual interpretation of the aforementioned formulas as high risk aversion asymptotics for isoe-
lastic investors, in the same spirit as in Cˇerny´ (2009) and Nutz (2012).
Theorem 3.1 (High Risk Aversion Asymptotics). An investor with constant relative risk aversion
γ > 0 trades to achieve the maximal equivalent safe rate ESRγ = maxϕ ESRγ(ϕ), where
ESRγ(ϕ) = lim
T→∞
1
T
logE
[
(ΞϕT )
1−γ] 11−γ .
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Denote by λ¯γ,
7 LiPrγ, piγ±, ShTuγ and WeTuγ the corresponding gap, liquidity premium, trading
boundaries (as wealth fractions), share turnover, and (relative) wealth turnover (see GGMKS for
details). Then, as γ ↑ ∞, the following properties hold for a small spread ε > 0:
(i) The equivalent safe rate times relative risk aversion converges to the equivalent annuity times
absolute risk aversion, i.e.,
lim
γ↑∞
γ ESRγ = αEAα =
σ2
2
(µ¯2 − λ¯2).
(ii) The gap λ¯γ converges to the gap λ¯.
(iii) The liquidity premium LiPrγ converges to LiPr.
(iv) The trading boundaries piγ± as wealth fractions, times γ, converge to the trading boundaries
ηα±, as position values, times α, i.e.,
lim
γ↑∞
γpiγ± = αηα±.
(v) Share turnover ShTuγ converges to relative turnover ShTu.
(vi) Relative wealth turnover, times γ, converges to absolute turnover times α.
This result clarifies some properties of the isoelastic quantities. For example (GGMKS, Section
3.4), share turnover converges to a finite limit as relative risk aversion increases. Theorem 2.3
identifies this limit as the relative turnover of exponential utility. By contrast, relative wealth
turnover declines to zero as risk aversion increases but, once rescaled by γ, it converges to absolute
turnover for exponential utility.
3.3 Trading Volume and Endogenous Spreads
An attraction of exponential utility is that, because the value of the investor’s risky position is
bounded, then also total rebalancing costs are bounded. These costs are in turn related to the
profits of a market maker, who earns the costs paid by the investor. Thus, exponential utility is
well-suited to develop a valuation model of a market maker, in which both trading and spreads are
endogenous.
If the market maker acts as a monopolist, and fixes the spread to maximize profits, the model
yields an endogenous optimal spread, which depends on investment opportunities only. The monop-
olist tradeoff is clear: a larger spread increases the profit of each transaction, but reduces demand
for trading.
Bid and ask prices alone are not sufficient to determine profits. What is missing is the “book”
price S¯t, at which the market maker values his inventory.
8 Such a price must lie within the bid-ask
spread: whichever policy the investor chooses, the average execution price will be within the bid-ask
spread. Thus, we denote the book value by S¯t = St(1 − εδ), with δ = 0 and δ = 1 leading to the
ask and bid prices respectively. With this notation, the average profits are:
ProfitT =
∫ T
0
(St − S¯t)dϕ↑t +
∫ T
0
(S¯t − (1− ε)St)dϕ↓t . (3.3)
7This is the gap in business time, replacing µ and σ2 with µ¯ and 1, respectively, in GGMKS, Theorem 2.2.
8The book price also admits the interpretation of production cost of the asset for the monopolist market maker.
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Figure 1: Expected value of future fees (vertical axis, in dollars) against the spread ε (horizontal
axis). The plot compares the case of fees earned 100% on purchases (solid line), 50% on purchases
and sales (long dashing), and 100% on sales (short dashing). Parameters are µ = 8%, σ = 16%,
and α = (µ/σ2)/100, corresponding to a frictionless position of η = µ/ασ2 = 100 dollars, and both
axes are in logarithmic scale.
In other words, while the investor is only sensitive to the final bid and ask prices, the market
maker’s profits depend separately on sales or purchases, depending on the choice of the book price.
Plugging S¯t = St(1 − εδ) in the above expression, and passing to the limit as T ↑ ∞, average
profits become equal to:
Profit = lim
T→∞
1
T
ProfitT = ε
(
δWeTuα−+
1− δ
1− ε WeTuα+
)
, (3.4)
where WeTu− and WeTu+ denote the expressions for expected purchases and sales, which add to
absolute turnover in Theorem 2.3:
WeTuα− =
σ2
2
ηα−(2µ¯− 1)
(u(λ¯)/l(λ¯))2µ¯−1 − 1 WeTuα+ =
σ2
2
ηα+(1− µ¯)
(u(λ¯)/l(λ¯))1−2µ¯ − 1 .
Figure 1 shows the market maker’s expected profit, as a function of the spread ε, for δ = 1, 0.5, 0.
When profits are concentrated on purchases (δ = 1), the market maker optimally sets the spread
in the range of 3-4%. This value is high compared to the spreads currently observed in US and
European equities, in which market makers are no longer monopolists. However, such a figure
is typical of the spreads observed on small capitalization stocks (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986),
which are traded by fewer dealers.
By contrast, the model leads to unreasonably high spreads, well above 20%, if the profits are
split equally between sales and purchases, or concentrated on sales (δ = 0.5 or 0). This result, if
counterintuitive initially, is implied by the asymmetry between expected sales (δ = 0) and expected
purchases (δ = 1). Because the exponential investor wants to keep the risky position approximately
fixed, and because the risky asset grows on average, the investor steadily realizes past gains over
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time, as the risky position reaches the selling boundary. By contrast, purchases occur after large
drops in the asset price, which are much less frequent.
This observation in fact hints at a weakness of the model, the absence of dividends, which in
practice allow the investor to avoid selling shares, cashing dividends instead. Thus, using a value
of δ close to 1 is a plausible assumption, which remedies in part the absence of dividends in the
model.
3.4 Finite Horizon Bounds. Myopic Probability as Risk Neutral.
A novel aspect of our analysis is the derivation of finite horizon bounds (Guasoni and Robertson,
2012) in the context of exponential utility. These bounds offer estimates on the performance of the
candidate long-run optimal policy on any intermediate horizon T . They are both a mathematical
device to prove the verification theorem, and a diagnostic tool to determine at which horizons the
long-run optimal policy is effective enough. For exponential utility, finite horizon bounds admit an
especially appealing form – in monetary units. As for isoelastic utilities, the respective asymptotics
show that — at the first order — our stationary long-run policy is also optimal for any fixed finite
horizon T > 0, because the corresponding utility matches the finite horizon value function at the
first nontrivial order.
Theorem 3.2 (Finite horizon bounds). For any horizon T > 0, the payoff X˜φT of a generic admis-
sible strategy φ in the frictionless shadow market S˜ satisfies
− 1
α
logE
[
e−αX˜
φ
T
]
≤ X˜φ0 + σ2β¯T +
1
α
E˜[q˜(Υ0)− q˜(ΥT )] = X˜φ0 + σ2β¯T +O( εα).
For the shadow payoff corresponding to the long-run optimal strategy ϕ from Theorem 2.3,
− 1
α
logE
[
e−αX˜
ϕ
T
]
= X˜ϕ0 + σ
2β¯T − 1
α
log E˜[eq˜(ΥT )−q˜(Υ0)] = X˜ϕ0 + σ
2β¯T +O( εα).
Here E˜[·] denotes the expectation with respect to the unique risk-neutral probability for S˜, Υ the
centered logarithm of the risky position in Theorem 2.4, and q˜ the deterministic function defined in
Lemma 5.7 below.
A new mathematical insight of this theorem is that, with exponential utility, the risk neutral
probability replaces the myopic probability in the finite-horizon bounds. By definition, under the
myopic probability the logarithmic policy coincides with the optimal policy under the real prob-
ability. Thus, strictly speaking, a risk-neutral probability is never myopic, because a logarithmic
investor (in fact, any investor) takes a zero position in a risky asset with null return.
Yet, the finite-horizon bounds in the theorem above involve expectations under the risk-neutral
probability, just as the similar bounds in Guasoni and Robertson (2012) involve expectations under
the myopic probability. The intuition is that, as relative risk aversion increases, the risky weight in
the optimal isoelastic policy decreases to zero, and so does the drift under the myopic probability.
Even as the weight decreases to zero, the monetary position can converge to a finite amount, as it
happens for exponential utility.
Duality theory sheds further light on the bounds. For any payoff X and any stochastic discount
factor (or martingale density) M = dQ/dP , Jensen’s inequality implies that:
− 1
α
logE
[
e−αX
]
= − 1
α
logEQ
[
e−αX−logM
]
≤ EQ [X] + 1
α
E [M logM ] . (3.5)
For a fixed payoff X, this inequality still holds passing to the infimum over M , thereby indicating
that equality may only hold when M has minimal entropy. This abstract inequality also shows
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that the minimal entropy is interpreted as a monetary certainty equivalent, which represents the
opportunity value of trading in the market over a given horizon. In the statement in Theorem 3.2,
this opportunity value decomposes into the integral term, which increases linearly with the horizon,
and leads to the equivalent annuity, and into the transitory term with q˜, which oscillates with the
relative position of the portfolio within the no-trade region.
3.5 Multiple Risky Assets
Consider a market with risky assets S1, . . . , Sd following
dSit/S
i
t = µidt+ σidW
i
t ,
for excess returns µi > 0, volatilities σi > 0, and independent standard Brownian motions W
i.
With exponential utility, the optimal policy in a market with several such independent risky
assets entails no-trade regions for each asset, which coincide with the no-trade regions obtained for
each risky asset alone, that is, in a market with a single risky asset (Liu, 2004). In our setting, the
following verification theorem applies, which allows to avoid the technical conditions in Liu (2004).
The implication is that the equivalent annuity for multiple independent risky assets is the sum of
the equivalent annuities for each asset.
Theorem 3.3. For i = 1, . . . , d, let S˜i be the shadow price from Lemma 5.6, with corresponding
optimal strategy (ϕ0,i, ϕi) from Lemma 5.8 in the market with safe asset S0 and risky asset Si. Then,
S˜ = (S˜1, . . . , S˜d) is a shadow price in the market with safe asset S0 and risky assets S1, . . . , Sd,
with optimal strategy (
∑d
i=1 ϕ
0,i, ϕ1, . . . , ϕd) and corresponding equivalent annuity
EAα =
d∑
i=1
EAiα =
d∑
i=1
σ2i
2α
(µ¯2i − λ¯2i ).
Here, µ¯i = µi/σ
2
i and each gap λ¯i is defined as in item iv) of Theorem 2.3. Moreover, like the
equivalent annuity, relative and absolute turnover also add across independent assets.
These decompositions are unique for exponential utility, and fail for utilities in the isoelastic
class. For example, Akian, Menaldi and Sulem (1996) show that, in a market with two identical
and independent assets, the no-trade region for each asset is wider than the no-trade region for
a market with that asset alone. As a result, the equivalent safe rate for the two-asset market is
greater than the sum of the equivalent safe rates.
3.6 Safe Rate
Throughout the paper, we assume a zero safe rate. This choice is made in part to ease notation,
and the results can be adapted to the case of a constant safe rate r, with an important caveat.
For an exponential investor with a long horizon, an arbitrarily small safe rate r is preferable to
any risky investment opportunity µ¯. The reason is that the optimal policy of this particularly
risk-averse investor is to keep only a bounded amount of money in the risky asset, whence her
wealth on average grows linearly over time. By contrast, a positive safe rate allows wealth to grow
exponentially – without risk. Therefore, full investment in the safe asset is eventually preferred by
the exponential investor in the long run.
Nevertheless, the finite horizon bounds in Theorem 3.2 remain valid even for a positive safe rate.
Indeed, setting αˆ = erTα in Theorem 3.2 for discounted payoffs, it follows that the undiscounted
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payoff X˜φT of any admissible strategy φ in the frictionless shadow market S˜ satisfies
− 1
α
logE
[
e−αX˜
φ
T
]
≤ erT X˜φ0 + σ2β¯T +
1
α
E˜[q˜(Υ0)− q˜(ΥT )] = erT X˜φ0 + σ2β¯T +O( εαT ).
Likewise, the shadow payoff of the long-run optimal strategy ϕ in Theorem 2.3 satisfies
− 1
α
logE
[
e−αX˜
ϕ
T
]
= erT X˜ϕ0 + σ
2β¯T − 1
α
log E˜[eq˜(ΥT )−q˜(Υ0)] = erT X˜ϕ0 + σ
2β¯T +O( εαT ).
Hence, our long-run optimal policy still matches the finite horizon value function up to terms of
order O(ε/T ). However, as the horizon becomes large, the contribution of the risky investment
grows only linearly with the horizon T . Hence it becomes negligible, as the certainty equivalent
grows exponentially.
4 Heuristics
In this section, we first use informal arguments from stochastic control to determine a candidate
for the optimal policy. Then, we derive a candidate shadow price process, which is key for the
subsequent verification.
4.1 Optimal Policy
For a trading strategy (ϕ0t , ϕt), write the number of stocks ϕ = ϕ
↑ − ϕ↓ as the difference of the
cumulative numbers of stocks purchased and sold, and denote by
Xt = ϕ
0
t , Yt = ϕtSt,
the values of the safe and risky positions in terms of the ask price St. Then, the self-financing
condition, and the dynamics of S imply
dXt =− Stdϕ↑t + (1− ε)Stdϕ↓t ,
dYt =µYtdt+ σYtdWt + Stdϕ
↑
t − Stdϕ↓t .
Consider the problem of maximizing the expected exponential utility U(x) = −e−αx from terminal
wealth at time T . Denote by V (t, x, y) its value function, which depends on time as well as the safe
and risky positions. Itoˆ’s formula yields:
dV (t,Xt, Yt) =Vtdt+ VxdXt + VydYt +
1
2Vyyd〈Y, Y 〉t
=
(
Vt + µYtVy +
σ2
2
Y 2t Vyy
)
dt
+ St(Vy − Vx)dϕ↑t + St((1− ε)Vx − Vy)dϕ↓t + σYtVydWt,
where the arguments of the functions are omitted for brevity. Because V (t,Xt, Yt) must be a
supermartingale for any choice of the cumulative purchases and sales ϕ↑, ϕ↓ (which are increasing
processes), it follows that Vy − Vx ≤ 0 and (1− ε)Vx − Vy ≤ 0, that is
1 ≤ Vx
Vy
≤ 1
1− ε.
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In the interior of this region, the drift of V (t,Xt, Yt) cannot be positive, and must become zero for
the optimal policy,
Vt + µYtVy +
σ2
2
Y 2t Vyy = 0 if 1 <
Vx
Vy
<
1
1− ε.
To simplify further, we use the usual scaling for exponential utility (cf., e.g., Davis, Panas and
Zariphopoulou (1993)). Moreover – in the long run – the value function should grow exponentially
with the horizon at a constant rate. This leads to the following ansatz for the value function:
V (t,Xt, Yt) = −e−αXteασ2β¯tv(Yt), (4.1)
which reduces the HJB equation to
1
2y
2v′′(y) + µ¯yv′(y) + αβ¯v(y) = 0 if 1 <
−αv(y)
v′(y)
<
1
1− ε.
Conjecturing that the set {y : 1 < −αv(y)v′(y) < 11−ε} coincides with some interval l < y < u to be
determined, the following free boundary problem arises:
1
2y
2v′′(y) + µ¯yv′(y) + αβ¯v(y) = 0 if l < y < u, (4.2)
v′(l) + αv(l) = 0, (4.3)
(1/(1− ε))v′(u) + αv(u) = 0. (4.4)
These conditions are not enough to identify the solution, because they can be matched for any
choice of the trading boundaries l, u. The optimal boundaries are the ones that also satisfy the
smooth-pasting conditions (cf. Dumas (1991)), formally obtained by differentiating (4.3) and (4.4)
with respect to l and u, respectively:
v′′(l) + αv′(l) = 0, (4.5)
(1/(1− ε))v′′(u) + αv′(u) = 0. (4.6)
In addition to the reduced value function v, this system requires to solve for β¯ (and hence the
equivalent annuity σ2β¯) as well as the trading boundaries l and u. Substituting (4.5) and (4.3)
into (4.2) yields
1
2(−α)2l2v + µ¯(−α)lv + αβ¯v = 0.
Setting ηα− = l, and factoring out −αv, it follows that
−α
2
η2α− + µ¯ηα− − β¯ = 0.
Note that ηα− is the risky position when it is time to buy, and hence the risky position is valued at
the ask price. The same argument for u shows that the other solution of the quadratic equation is
ηα+ = u(1− ε), i.e., the risky position when it is time to sell, and hence the risky position is valued
at the bid price. Thus, the optimal policy is to buy when the “ask” position falls below ηα−, sell
when the “bid” position rises above ηα+, and do nothing in between. Since ηα− and ηα+ solve the
same quadratic equation, they are related to β¯ via
ηα± =
µ¯
α
±
√
µ¯2 − 2β¯α
α
.
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It is convenient to set β¯ = (µ¯2 − λ¯2)/2α, because β¯ = µ¯2/2α without transaction costs. With this
notation, the buy and sell boundaries are just
ηα± =
µ¯± λ¯
α
.
Now that l(λ¯), u(λ¯) are identified by ηα± in terms of λ¯, it remains to find λ¯. After deriving l(λ¯) and
u(λ¯), the boundaries in the problem (4.2)-(4.4) are no longer free, but fixed. With the substitution
v(y) = e−
∫ log(y/l(λ¯))
0 w(z)dz, i.e., w(y) = − l(λ¯)e
yv′(l(λ¯)ey)
v(l(λ¯)ey)
,
the boundary problem (4.2)-(4.4) simplifies to a Riccati ODE:
w′(y)− w(y)2 + (2µ¯− 1)w(y)− (µ¯− λ¯) (µ¯+ λ¯) = 0, y ∈ [0, log u(λ¯)/l(λ¯)], (4.7)
w(0) = µ¯− λ¯, (4.8)
w(log(u(λ¯)/l(λ¯))) = µ¯+ λ¯, (4.9)
where
u(λ¯)
l(λ¯)
=
1
(1− ε)
ηα+
ηα−
=
1
(1− ε)
µ¯+ λ¯
µ¯− λ¯ .
For each λ¯, the initial value problem (4.7)-(4.8) has a solution w(·), which we now denote by w(λ¯, ·)
with a slight abuse of notation. Thus, the correct value of λ¯ is identified by the second boundary
condition (4.9):
w(λ¯, log(u(λ¯)/l(λ¯))) = µ¯+ λ¯. (4.10)
4.2 Shadow Market
The key to making the above arguments rigorous is to find a frictionless shadow price S˜, which
yields the same optimal policy as the one derived in the previous section. This step requires another
heuristic argument.
As for logarithmic utility (Gerhold, Muhle-Karbe and Schachermayer, 2010b,a) and power utility
(GGMKS), the idea is that S˜/S, the ratio between the shadow and the ask price, should only depend
on the state variable. Hence, we look for a shadow price of the form
S˜t =
St
eΥt
g(eΥt),
where eΥt = Yt/l is the risky position at the ask price S, and centered at the buying boundary
l = ηα− = (µ¯− λ¯)/α. The number of units ϕ remains constant inside the no-trade region, so that
in its interior the dynamics of Υ = log(ϕ/l) + log(S) coincides with that of log(S). Moreover, since
Υ must remain in [0, log(u/l)] by definition, Υ is reflected at the boundaries. Hence,
dΥt = (µ− σ22 )dt+ σdWt + dLt − dUt,
for nondecreasing local time processes L,U that only increase on {Υt = 0} (resp. {Υt = log(u/l)}).
The function g : [1, u/l]→ [1, (1− ε)u/l] is a C2-function satisfying the smooth pasting conditions
(cf. Gerhold, Muhle-Karbe and Schachermayer (2010b))
g(1) = 1, g(u/l) = (1− ε)u/l, g′(1) = 1, g′(u/l) = 1− ε. (4.11)
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The first two conditions ensure that S˜ equals the ask price S (resp. the bid price S(1 − ε)) when
Υ sits at the buying boundary 0 (resp. at the selling boundary log(u/l)), while the latter two
conditions ensure that the diffusion coefficient of S˜t/St vanishes both at the bid 1 − ε and at the
ask 1, and hence that these bounds are not breached. The boundary conditions for g′, and Itoˆ’s
formula imply that S˜ is an Itoˆ process with dynamics
dS˜t/S˜t = µ˜(Υt)dt+ σ˜(Υt)dWt,
where
µ˜(y) =
µg′(ey)ey + σ
2
2 g
′′(ey)e2y
g(ey)
, and σ˜(y) =
σg′(ey)ey
g(ey)
.
To identify the function g, first derive the HJB equation for a generic g. Then, compare this
equation to the one obtained in the previous section for the market with transaction costs. Because
the value function of the two problems must be the same, matching the two HJB equations identifies
the function g.
The wealth process corresponding to a policy9 η˜ in terms of the shadow price S˜ is
dX˜t = η˜tµ˜(Υt)dt+ η˜tσ˜(Υt)dWt.
With the standard ansatz V˜ (t, X˜t,Υt) for the value function, Itoˆ’s formula yields
dV˜ (t, X˜t,Υt) =
(
V˜t + µ˜η˜tV˜x +
σ˜2
2 η˜
2
t V˜xx +
(
µ− σ22
)
V˜y +
σ2
2 V˜yy + σσ˜η˜tV˜xy
)
dt
+ V˜y(dLt − dUt) + (σ˜η˜tV˜x + σV˜y)dWt,
where the arguments of the functions are omitted for brevity. Since V˜ must be a supermartingale
for any strategy, and a martingale for the optimal strategy, the HJB equation reads as:
sup
η˜
(
V˜t + µ˜η˜V˜x +
σ˜2
2 η˜
2V˜xx +
(
µ− σ22
)
V˜y +
σ2
2 V˜yy + σσ˜η˜V˜xy
)
= 0
with the Neumann boundary conditions
V˜y(0) = V˜y(log(u/l)) = 0.
The homogeneity of the value function, (i.e., V˜ (t, x, y) = −e−αxv˜(t, y)) leads to the first-order
condition:
η˜t =
1
α
(
µ˜
σ˜2
+
σ
σ˜
v˜y
v˜
)
.
Plugging this equality back into the HJB equation yields the nonlinear equation
v˜t +
(
µ− σ
2
2
)
v˜y +
σ2
2
v˜yy − 1
2
(
µ˜
σ˜
+ σ
v˜y
v˜
)2
v˜ = 0.
Now, the equivalent annuity of the optimal policy must be the same for the shadow market as for
the transaction cost market in the previous section. Thus, in view of (4.1), set
v˜(t, y) = eασ
2β¯te−
∫ y
0 w˜(z)dz,
9Note that this is the monetary amount rather than the fraction of wealth in the risky asset.
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which implies that v˜t = αβ¯σ
2v˜ and v˜y/v˜ = −w˜. Then, the HJB equation reduces to the inhomoge-
neous Riccati ODE
w˜′ − w˜2 + (2µ¯− 1) w˜ − (µ¯2 − λ¯2) +
(
µ˜
σσ˜
− w˜
)2
= 0 (4.12)
with the boundary conditions
w˜(0) = w˜(log(u/l)) = 0.
For S˜ to be a shadow price, its value function
V˜t = −eασ2β¯t−αX˜t−
∫ y
0 w˜(z)dz
must coincide with the value function
Vt = −eασ2β¯t−αXt−
∫ y
0 w(z)dz
for the transaction cost problem derived above. By definition, the safe position X and the wealth
X˜ in terms of S˜ = Se−Υg(eΥ) are related via
X˜t −Xt = ϕ0t + ϕtS˜t − ϕ0t = g(eΥt)l.
Now, the condition V˜ = V implies that
0 = αg(ey)l +
∫ y
0
(w˜(z)− w(z))dz,
which in turn means that
w˜(y) = w(y)− αg′(ey)eyl.
Plugging this relation into the ODE (4.12) for w˜, using the ODE (4.7) for w, and simplifying gives(
−w(y) + µ˜(y)
σσ˜(y)
)2
= 0.
Inserting the definitions of µ˜(y) and σ˜(y), this relation is tantamount to the following ODE for g:
g′′(ey)ey
g′(ey)
+ 2µ¯− 2w(y) = 0. (4.13)
Now, the substitution10
k(y) =
1
g′(ey)ey
, i.e., g(ey) = 1 +
∫ y
0
1
k(z)
dz,
reduces this ODE to the inhomogeneous linear equation
k′(y) = k(y) (2µ¯− 1− 2w(y)) . (4.14)
The smooth pasting condition for g implies k(0) = 1/g′(1) = 1. The solution to (4.14) then
follows from the variation of constants formula. Plugging in the explicit formula (5.1) for w, and
integrating, leads to (with a = a(λ¯) and b = b(λ¯) as in (5.2)) the solution11
k(y) =
(
1 +
b2
a2
)
cos2
[
tan−1
(
b
a
)
+ ay
]
.
10For the second representation, we already use the boundary condition g(1) = 1.
11Here we only show the case µ¯ > 1/4. The other case leads to another explicit formula, whence similar calculations
follow.
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Now the chain of substitutions is reversed starting from k, which is known explicitly up to the
constant λ¯. First, set w˜(y) = w(y)− αl/k(y); then w˜(0) = 0 by the initial conditions for w and k.
To establish the other boundary condition w˜(log(u/l)) = 0, it suffices to check that k(log(u/l)) =
(µ¯− λ¯)/(µ¯+ λ¯). To see this, insert the boundary condition for w′,
µ¯+ λ¯ =w′(log(u/l)) =
a2
cos2[tan−1( ba) + a log(
u
l )]
, (4.15)
into the explicit formula for k(y).12 Now, observe that the function
g(ey) = 1 +
∫ y
0
1
k(z)
dz = 1 +
a
a2 + b2
(
tan
[
tan−1
(
b
a
)
+ ay
]
− b
a
)
evidently satisfies g(1) = 1. Moreover, g(u/l) = (1− ε)u/l, which follows by inserting the terminal
condition for w,
µ¯+ λ¯ = w(log(u/l)) = a tan
[
tan−1
(
b
a
)
+ a log
(u
l
)]
+
(
µ¯− 12
)
,
into the explicit expression for g. Finally, these boundary conditions for g and those for k imply
that g′(1) = 1 and g′(u/l) = 1 − ε, i.e., g satisfies the smooth pasting conditions (4.11) and, by
construction, also the ODE (4.13).
5 Proofs
In the previous section we first used informal control arguments to find a candidate optimal policy
and its corresponding value function. Then, we used this guess to derive a candidate shadow price,
matching a generic shadow value function with the one of the transaction cost problem.
In this section, we prove a verification theorem for the optimal policy in the frictionless market
corresponding to the candidate shadow price process, and show that the optimal shadow strategy
only entails purchasing (selling) when the shadow price coincides with the ask (bid) price. Thus,
the policy is also feasible and optimal in the market with transaction costs.
Key to this goal are the new finite horizon bounds for exponential utility in Theorem 3.2.
5.1 Explicit formulas and their properties
The first step to construct the shadow price is to determine, for a given small λ¯ > 0, an explicit
expression for the solution w of the ODE (4.7), complemented by the initial condition (4.8).
Lemma 5.1. For sufficiently small λ¯ > 0, the function
w(λ¯, y) =
{
a(λ¯) coth[coth−1(b(λ¯)/a(λ¯))− a(λ¯)y] + (µ¯− 12), if µ¯ ≤ 1/4,
a(λ¯) tan[tan−1(b(λ¯)/a(λ¯)) + a(λ¯)y] + (µ¯− 12), if µ¯ > 1/4,
(5.1)
with
a(λ¯) =
√∣∣∣µ¯2 − λ¯2 − (12 − µ¯)2∣∣∣ and b(λ) = 12 + λ¯, (5.2)
12The first equalities in (4.15) follows from the ODE for w, whereas the second equality is obtained from the explicit
formula (5.1).
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is a local solution of
w′(y)− w2(y) + (2µ¯− 1)w(y)− (µ¯2 − λ¯2) = 0, w(0) = µ¯− λ¯. (5.3)
Moreover, y 7→ w(λ¯, y) is increasing in both cases.
Proof. The first part of the assertion is verified by taking derivatives. The second follows by
inspection of the explicit formulas.
Next, establish that the crucial constant λ¯, which determines both the no-trade region and the
equivalent annuity, is well-defined.
Lemma 5.2. Let w(λ¯, ·) be defined as in Lemma 5.1, and set
l(λ¯) =
µ¯− λ¯
α
, u(λ¯) =
1
(1− ε)
µ¯+ λ¯
α
.
Then, for sufficiently small ε > 0, there exists a unique solution λ¯ of
w
(
λ¯, log
(
u(λ¯)
l(λ¯)
))
− (µ¯+ λ¯) = 0. (5.4)
As ε ↓ 0, it has the asymptotics
λ¯ =
(
3
4
µ¯2
)1/3
ε1/3 +O(ε).
Proof. The explicit expression for w in Lemma 5.1 implies that w(λ¯, x) in Lemma 5.1 is analytic
in both variables at (0, 0). By the initial condition in (5.3), its power series has the form
w(λ¯, y) = (µ¯− λ¯) +
∞∑
i=1
∞∑
j=0
Wijy
iλ¯j ,
where expressions for the coefficients Wij are computed by expanding the explicit expression for w.
Hence the left-hand side of the boundary condition (5.4) is an analytic function of ε and λ¯. Its power
series expansion shows that the coefficients of ε0λ¯j vanish for j = 0, 1, 2, so that the condition (5.4)
reduces to
λ¯3
∑
i≥0
Aiλ¯
i = ε
∑
i,j≥0
Bijε
iλ¯j (5.5)
with (computable) coefficients Ai and Bij . This equation has to be solved for λ¯. Since
A0 = − 4
3µ¯
and B00 = µ¯
are non-zero, divide the equation (5.5) by
∑
i≥0Aiλ¯
i, and take the third root, obtaining that, for
some Cij ,
λ¯ = ε1/3
∑
i,j≥0
Cijε
iλ¯j = ε1/3
∑
i,j≥0
Cij(ε
1/3)3iλ¯j .
The right-hand side is an analytic function of λ¯ and ε1/3, so that the implicit function theorem (Gun-
ning and Rossi, 2009, Theorem I.B.4) yields a unique solution λ¯ (for ε sufficiently small), which is
an analytic function of ε1/3. Its power series coefficients can be computed at any order.
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Henceforth, consider a small relative bid-ask spread ε > 0, and let λ¯ denote the constant in
Lemma 5.2. Moreover, set w(y) := w(λ¯, y), a := a(λ¯), b := b(λ¯), and u := u(λ¯), l := l(λ¯). By
inspection, it follows that
Lemma 5.3. In both cases of Lemma 5.1,
w′(0) = µ¯− λ¯, w′
(
log
(u
l
))
= µ¯+ λ¯.
The next lemma states the properties of the function k.
Lemma 5.4. Define
k(y) =

(
b2
a2
− 1
)
sinh2
[
coth−1
(
b
a
)− ay] , if µ¯ ≤ 1/4,(
b2
a2
+ 1
)
cos2
[
tan−1
(
b
a
)
+ ay
]
, if µ¯ > 1/4.
Then k satisfies the linear ODE
k′(y) = k(y) (2µ¯− 1− 2w(y)) , 0 ≤ y ≤ log
(u
l
)
,
with boundary conditions
k(0) = 1, k
(
log
(u
l
))
=
µ¯− λ¯
µ¯+ λ¯
.
Moreover, k is strictly decreasing and, in particular, strictly positive on [0, log(u/l)].
Proof. That k satisfies the ODE follows by insertion. The identities cos2[tan−1(x)] = 1/(1 + x2)
and sinh2[coth−1(x)] = 1/(x2 − 1) yield the boundary condition at zero, whereas the boundary
condition at log(u/l) follows by inserting w′(log(u/l)) = µ¯+ λ¯. Finally, the ODE and a comparison
argument yield that k is strictly decreasing.
Lemma 5.5. For 0 ≤ y ≤ log(u/l), define
g(ey) := 1 +
∫ y
0
1
k(z)
dz.
Then
g(ey) =
{
1 + a
b2−a2
(
sinh
[
sinh−1
(
b
a
)− ay]− ba) , if µ¯ ≤ 1/4,
1 + a
b2+a2
(
tan
[
tan−1
(
b
a
)
+ ay
]− ba) , if µ¯ > 1/4,
and g satisfies the boundary and smooth pasting conditions
g(1) = 1, g(u/l) = (1− ε)u/l, g′(1) = 1, g′(u/l) = 1− ε.
Moreover, g′ > 0 so that g maps [1, u/l] onto [1, (1− ε)u/l]. Finally, g solves the ODE
g′′(ey)ey
g′(ey)
+ 2µ¯− 2w(y) = 0. (5.6)
Proof. The explicit representation follows by elementary integration. Evidently, g(1) = 1. More-
over, g(u/l) = (1−ε)u/l follows by inserting µ¯+λ¯ = w(log(u/l)). Next, since g′(ey) = 1/eyk(y), the
boundary conditions for g and k imply the smooth pasting conditions g′(1) = 1 and g′(u/l) = 1−ε.
Furthermore, k > 0 and g′(ey) = 1/eyk(y) show that g′ > 0. Finally, computing the derivatives
verifies that g indeed satisfies the ODE (5.6).
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5.2 The shadow price and verification
The construction of the shadow price proceeds in analogy to logarithmic utilities (Gerhold, Muhle-
Karbe and Schachermayer, 2010b,a) and power utilities (GGMKS). For y ∈ [0, log(u/l)], let Υ be
a Brownian motion with drift, reflected at 0 and log(u/l), that is, the continuous, adapted process
with values in [0, log(u/l)] such that
dΥt = (µ− σ2/2)dt+ σdWt + dLt − dUt, Υ0 = y0, (5.7)
for nondecreasing adapted local time processes L and U increasing only on the sets {Υt = 0} and
{Υt = log(u/l)}, respectively.
Lemma 5.6. Define
y0 =

0, if ξS0 ≤ l,
log(u/l), if ξS0 ≥ u,
log(ξS0/l), otherwise,
(5.8)
and let Υ be defined as in (5.7), started at Υ0 = y0. Then S˜ = Se
−Υg(eΥ), with g as in Lemma 5.5,
is a positive Itoˆ process with dynamics
dS˜t/S˜t = µ˜(Υt)dt+ σ˜(Υt)dWt, S˜0 = S0e
−y0g(ey0),
for
µ˜(y) =
µg′(ey)ey + σ
2
2 g
′′(ey)e2y
g(ey)
, σ˜(y) =
σg′(ey)ey
g(ey)
,
and S˜ takes values in the bid-ask spread [(1− ε)S, S].
Note that the first (resp. second) case in (5.8) occurs if the initial position ξS0 in the risky asset
lies below the buying boundary l or above the selling boundary u. Then, there is a jump from
the initial position (ϕ00−, ϕ0−) = (ξ0, ξ), which moves the position in the risky asset to the nearest
boundary of the interval [l, u]. Since this initial trade involves the purchase (resp. sale) of shares,
the initial value of S˜ is chosen to match the initial ask (resp. bid) price.
Proof of Lemma 5.6. The first part of the assertion follows from the smooth pasting conditions for
g and Itoˆ’s formula. As for the second part, since g′′(1) ≤ 0, a comparison argument yields that the
derivative (g′(y)y − g(y))/y2 of g(y)/y is non-positive. Hence g(1)/1 = 1 and g(u/l)/(u/l) = 1− ε
yield that S˜ = Sg(eΥ)e−Υ is indeed [(1− ε)S, S]-valued.
The long-run optimal portfolio in the frictionless “shadow market” with price process S˜ can
be determined by calculating finite horizon bounds, similarly as in Guasoni and Robertson (2012)
for power utility. Note that for the exponential utilities considered here the myopic probability
coincides with the (unique) risk-neutral probability for S˜.
Lemma 5.7. w˜(y) = w(y)− αg′(ey)eyl, with w and g as in Lemmas 5.1 and 5.5, solves the ODE
w˜′ − w˜2 + (2µ¯− 1) w˜ − (µ¯2 − λ¯2) +
(
µ˜
σσ˜
− w˜
)2
= 0, (5.9)
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with boundary conditions w˜(0) = w˜(log(u/l)) = 0. Moreover, denoting by q˜(y) =
∫ y
0 w˜(z)dz, the
shadow payoff X˜T corresponding to the policy η˜ =
1
α
(
µ˜
σ˜2
− σσ˜ w˜
)
(in terms of S˜) and the shadow
discount factor MT = E(−
∫ ·
0
µ˜
σ˜dWt)T satisfies the following bounds:
E
[
e−αX˜T
]
= e−αX˜0e−ασ
2β¯T E˜
[
eq˜(ΥT )−q˜(Υ0)
]
= e−αX˜0e−ασ
2β¯T +O(ε), (5.10)
e−αX˜0−E˜[logMT ] = e−αX˜0e−ασ
2β¯T eE˜[q˜(ΥT )−q˜(Υ0)] = e−αX˜0e−ασ
2β¯T +O(ε). (5.11)
Here, β¯ = (µ¯2− λ¯2)/2α and E˜[·] denotes the expectation with respect to the risk-neutral probability
Q˜ for S˜ with density process M .
Proof. That w˜ solves the ODE (5.9) is easily verified by taking derivatives, while the boundary
conditions immediately follow from their counterparts for w and g.
Next, note that µ˜, σ˜, η˜, w˜ are functions of Υt, but their argument is omitted throughout to ease
notation. To prove the first bound (5.10), notice that the shadow wealth process X˜ satisfies:
e−αX˜T = e−αX˜0 exp
(
−
∫ T
0
αη˜µ˜dt−
∫ T
0
αη˜σ˜dWt
)
= e−αX˜0 exp
(∫ T
0
(
− µ˜
2
σ˜2
+
µ˜σ
σ˜
w˜
)
dt+
∫ T
0
(
− µ˜
σ˜
+ σw˜
)
dWt
)
, (5.12)
where the second equality follows by substituting η˜ = 1α(
µ˜
σ˜2
− σσ˜ w˜). Now, Itoˆ’s formula and the
boundary conditions w˜(0) = w˜(log(u/l)) = 0 imply
q˜(ΥT )− q˜(Υ0) =
∫ T
0
((
µ− σ
2
2
)
w˜ +
σ2
2
w˜′
)
dt+
∫ T
0
σw˜dWt.
Plugging in the ODE for w˜, it follows that
q˜(ΥT )− q˜(Υ0) =
∫ T
0
(
− µ˜
2
2σ˜2
+
µ˜σ
σ˜
w˜ + ασ2β¯
)
dt+
∫ T
0
σw˜dWt. (5.13)
Using this identity to replace
∫ T
0 σw˜dWt in (5.12) and taking expectations then yields
E
[
e−αX˜T
]
= e−αX˜0e−ασ
2β¯TE
[
MT e
q˜(ΥT )−q˜(Υ0)
]
.
The first bound now follows by noting that, since µ˜(·)/σ˜(·) is bounded on the support [0, log(u/l)]
of its argument, the nonnegative local martingale M is in fact a true martingale, such that Q˜ is
well-defined.
As for the second bound, first notice that by definition of M and Girsanov’s theorem,
e−αX˜0−E˜[logMT ] = exp
(
−αX˜0 + E˜
[
−
∫ T
0
µ˜2
2σ˜2
dt+
∫ T
0
µ˜
σ˜
dW˜t
])
, (5.14)
where W˜t = Wt +
∫ t
0
µ˜
σ˜ds denotes a Q˜-Brownian motion. Again by using that the process µ˜/σ˜ is
bounded, it follows that the stochastic integral in (5.14) is a Q˜-martingale with vanishing expec-
tation. Using (5.13), also rewritten in terms of W˜ , to replace the Lebesgue integral in (5.14) then
shows
e−αX˜0−E˜[logMT ] = e−αX˜0e−ασ
2β¯T exp
(
E˜
[
q˜(ΥT )− q˜(Υ0) +
∫ T
0
(
µ˜
σ˜
− σw˜
)
dW˜t
])
.
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Since w˜(·) and µ˜(·)σ˜(·) are bounded on [0, log(u/l)], the dW˜t-term in this expression is a Q˜-martingale,
which yields the second bound (5.11).
The asymptotics follow by expanding the function q˜ as in the proof of GGMKS, Theorem 3.1
With the finite horizon bounds at hand, we can now establish that the policy η˜ is indeed long-run
optimal in the frictionless market with price S˜.
Lemma 5.8. The policy
η˜(Υt) =
1
α
(
µ˜(Υt)
σ˜2(Υt)
− σ
σ˜(Υt)
w˜(Υt)
)
= g(eΥt)l (5.15)
is long-run optimal with equivalent annuity σ2β¯ in the frictionless market with price process S˜. The
corresponding wealth process (in terms of S˜), and the numbers of safe and risky units satisfy
X˜ = (ξ0 + ξS˜0) +
∫ ·
0
η˜(Υt)µ˜(Υt)dt+
∫ ·
0
η˜(Υt)σ˜(Υt)dWt,
ϕ00− = ξ
0, ϕ0t = X˜t − η˜(Υt) for t ≥ 0,
ϕ0− = ξ, ϕt = η˜(Υt)/S˜t for t ≥ 0.
Proof. The formulas for the trading strategy and the wealth process associated to η˜ are immediate
consequences of the respective definitions. The second representation for η˜ follows by inserting the
definitions of µ˜, σ˜ from Lemma 5.6, the ODE (5.6) for g, and w(y)− w˜(y) = αg′(ey)eyl.
Next, note that ϕ is admissible for S˜, because (5.15) shows that the corresponding risky position
η˜ is bounded. Now, standard duality arguments for exponential utility imply that the shadow payoff
X˜φ corresponding to any admissible strategy φ satisfies the inequality
E
[
e−αX˜
φ
T
]
≥ e−αX˜φ0−E˜[logMT ]. (5.16)
Indeed, since σ˜(Υ) is uniformly bounded and the same holds for φS˜ by admissibility of φ and
(1− ε)S ≤ S˜ ≤ S, the local Q˜-martingale X˜φ = X˜φ0 +
∫ ·
0 φtdS˜t is in fact a true Q˜-martingale. Now,
dQ˜|FT /dP |FT = MT and Jensen’s inequality yield
E
[
e−αX˜
φ
T
]
= E˜
[
e−αX˜
φ
T−logMT
]
≥ e−αE˜[X˜φT ]−E˜[logMT ],
such that (5.16) follows from the Q˜-martingale property of the shadow wealth process X˜φ .
Inequality (5.16) in turn yields the following upper bound, valid for any admissible strategy φ
in the frictionless market with price process S˜:
lim inf
T→∞
(
1
−αT logE
[
e−αX˜
φ
T
])
≤ lim inf
T→∞
1
T
(
X˜φ0 +
1
α
E˜[logMT ]
)
.
The function q˜ in Lemma 5.7 is bounded on the compact support of its argument Υ. Hence, the
bound (5.11) in Lemma 5.7 implies that the right-hand side equals σ2β¯.
Likewise, the bound (5.10) in the same lemma implies that the shadow payoff X˜ϕ (corresponding
to the number of units ϕ, defined in terms of the policy η˜) satisfies, using again that q˜ is bounded,
lim inf
T→∞
1
αT
logE
[
e−αX˜
ϕ
T
]
= lim inf
T→∞
(
σ2β¯ +
X˜ϕ0
T
− 1
αT
log E˜
[
eq˜(ΥT )−q˜(Υ0)
])
= σ2β¯ ,
which shows that the policy η˜ attains this upper bound, and concludes the proof.
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The next Lemma establishes that S˜ is a shadow price.
Lemma 5.9. The number of shares ϕ = η˜/S˜ in the portfolio η˜ in Lemma 5.8 has the dynamics
dϕt/ϕt = dLt − dUt.
Thus, ϕ increases only when Υt = 0, that is, when S˜ equals the ask price, and decreases only when
Υt = log(u/l), that is, when S˜ equals the bid price.
Proof. Itoˆ’s formula applied to (5.15) yields
dη˜(Υt)
η˜(Υt)
=
µg′(eΥt)eΥt + σ
2
2 g
′′(eΥt)e2Υt
g(eΥt)
dt+
σg′(eΥt)eΥt
g(eΥt)
dWt +
g′(eΥt)eΥt
g(eΥt)
d(Lt − Ut).
Integrating ϕ = η˜/S˜ by parts, inserting the dynamics of η˜ and S˜, and simplifying, it follows that
dϕt
ϕt
=
g′(eΥt)eΥt
g(eΥt)
d(Lt − Ut).
Since L and U only increase on the sets {Υ = 0} and {Υ = log(u/l)}, respectively, the assertion
now follows from the boundary conditions for g and g′.
The equivalent annuity for any frictionless price within the bid-ask spread must be greater or
equal than in the original market with bid-ask process ((1 − ε)S, S), because the investor trades
at more favorable prices. For a shadow price, there is an optimal strategy that only entails buying
(resp. selling) stocks when S˜ coincides with the ask- resp. bid price. Hence, this strategy yields
the same payoff when executed at bid-ask prices, and is also optimal in the original model with
transaction costs. The corresponding equivalent annuity must also be the same, since the difference
due to the liquidation costs vanishes as the horizon grows in (2.1):
Proposition 5.10. Let S˜ be the shadow price for ((1 − ε)S, S) from Lemma 5.6, and (ϕ0, ϕ) the
corresponding long-run optimal strategy from Lemma 5.8. Then (ϕ0, ϕ) is long-run optimal for the
bid-ask process ((1− ε)S, S) as well, with the same equivalent annuity σ2β¯.
Proof. As ϕ only increases (resp. decreases) when S˜ = S (resp. S˜ = (1− ε)S), the strategy (ϕ0, ϕ)
is self-financing for the bid-ask process ((1−ε)S, S) as well. Moreover, (5.15) and (1−ε)S ≤ S˜ ≤ S
show that it is also admissible for ((1− ε)S, S) in the sense of Definition 2.1.
Now, since S ≥ S˜ ≥ S(1− ε) and the number ϕt of shares is always positive and bounded from
above by u/S > 0,
ϕ0t + ϕtS˜t ≥ ϕ0t + ϕ+t (1− ε)St − ϕ−t St ≥ ϕ0t + ϕtS˜t − εu.
These upper and lower bounds yield:
lim inf
T→∞
1
−αT logE
[
e−α(ϕ
0
T+ϕ
+
T (1−ε)ST−ϕ−T ST )
]
= lim inf
T→∞
1
−αT logE
[
e−α(ϕ
0
T+ϕT S˜T )
]
, (5.17)
that is, (ϕ0, ϕ) has the same growth rate, either with S˜ or with [(1− ε)S, S].
Now let (ψ0, ψ) be any admissible strategy for the bid-ask spread [(1 − ε)S, S], and define the
corresponding cash position in the shadow market as ψ˜0 = ψ00− −
∫ ·
0 S˜tdψt. Then (ψ˜
0, ψ) is a self-
financing trading strategy for the shadow price S˜, and ψ˜0 ≥ ψ0 because (1− ε)S ≤ S˜ ≤ S implies
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that
∫ ·
0 S˜tdψt ≤
∫ ·
0 Stdψ
↑
t −(1−ε)
∫ ·
0 Stdψ
↓
t . Together with S˜ ∈ [(1−ε)S, S], the long-run optimality
of (ϕ0, ϕ) for S˜, and (5.17), it follows that:
lim inf
T→∞
(
1
−αT logE
[
e−α(ψ
0
T+ψ
+
T (1−ε)ST−ψ−T ST )
])
≤ lim inf
T→∞
(
1
−αT logE
[
e−α(ψ˜
0
T+ψT S˜T )
])
≤ lim inf
T→∞
(
1
−αT logE
[
e−α(ϕ
0
T+ϕT S˜T )
])
= lim inf
T→∞
(
1
−αT logE
[
e−α(ϕ
0
T+ϕ
+
T (1−ε)ST−ϕ−T ST )
])
.
Hence (ϕ0, ϕ) is also long-run optimal for the bid-ask process ((1− ε)S, S).
Putting everything together, we can now complete the proofs of our main results:
Proofs of Theorem 2.3 i)− iv), vi), Theorem 2.4, Theorem 3.2. By Lemma 5.8, the strategy (ϕ0, ϕ)
is optimal in the frictionless market with price process S˜. Since the latter is a shadow price pro-
cess by Lemma 5.9, Proposition 5.10 yields that the same strategy is also optimal with the same
equivalent annuity σ2β¯ = σ
2
2α(µ¯
2 − λ¯2) in the original market with transaction costs. This proves
Theorem 2.4 and also Item i) of Theorem 2.3, since the definition of λ¯ in Lemma 5.1 matches iv)
by Lemma 5.2. Item ii) of Theorem 2.3 follows immediately by comparing the growth rate to its
frictionless value. Next, since S˜ is a shadow price, the buy resp. sell boundaries for (ϕ0, ϕ) are
quoted in terms of the ask resp. bid price. Item iii) then follows from the representation in Lemma
5.8, combined with the boundary conditions for g and the definitions of u, l in Lemma 5.2. The
corresponding asymptotic expansions in vi) are an immediate consequence of the fractional power
series for λ¯ (cf. Lemma 5.2) and Taylor expansion. Finally, Theorem 3.2 has been established in
Lemma 5.7 and the proof of Lemma 5.8.
Next, we prove Theorem 3.3, which generalizes the finite-horizon bounds to a market with
several uncorrelated assets.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Let M i = E(− ∫ ·0 µ˜i(Υit)σ˜i(Υit)dW it ) be the stochastic discount factor in the market
(S0, S˜i), where the coefficients µ˜i, σ˜i and the reflected Brownian motions Υ
i are defined as in Lemma
5.6. Then, since the risky assets Si are independent, the same holds for the processes Υi, M i, S˜i.
For the shadow wealth process X˜ϕ = X˜ϕ0 +
∑d
i=1
∫ ·
0 ϕ
i
tdS˜
i
t , the first univariate finite horizon bound
in Lemma 5.7 therefore yields
− 1
α
logE
[
e−αX˜
ϕ
T
]
= X˜ϕ0 +
d∑
i=1
σ2i β¯iT −
1
α
d∑
i=1
log E˜i
[
eq˜i(Υ
i
T )−q˜i(Υi0)
]
,
where E˜i[·] denotes expectation with respect to the measure with density process Mi, and the
constants β¯i and the functions q˜i are defined as in Lemma 5.7 for i = 1, . . . , d. Since the mappings
q˜i are bounded on the compact supports of the Υ
i, it follows that
lim inf
T→∞
− 1
αT
logE
[
e−αX
ϕ
T
]
=
d∑
i=1
σ2i β¯i. (5.18)
Next, notice that since each S˜i only depends on one of the independent Brownian motions, Gir-
sanov’s theorem implies that M = E(−∑di=1 ∫ ·0 µ˜i(Υit)σ˜i(Υit)dW it ) is a stochastic discount factor for the
market (S0, S˜1, . . . , S˜d). Hence it follows verbatim as in the proof of Lemma 5.8 that the shadow
wealth process X˜φ associated to any admissible strategy φ satisfies
E
[
e−αX˜
φ
T
]
≥ e−αX˜φ0−E˜[logMT ],
24
where E˜[·] denotes the expectation with respect to the measure with density process M . Since each
of the M i only depends on one of the independent Brownian motions, Yor’s formula implies that
MT =
∏d
i=1M
i
T and hence, by independence of the M
i,
E
[
e−αX˜
φ
T
]
≥ e−αX˜φ0
d∏
i=1
e−E˜i[logM
i
T ],
where E˜i[·] denotes the expectation with respect to the measure with density process M i. Combined
with the second univariate finite horizon bound from Lemma 5.7, it follows that
E
[
e−αX˜
φ
T
]
≥ e−αX˜φ0
d∏
i=1
e−ασ
2
i β¯iT+E˜i[q˜i(Υ
i
T )−q˜i(Υi0)].
In view of the boundedness of the q˜i, this inequality yields
lim inf
T→∞
− 1
αT
logE
[
e−αX˜
φ
T
]
≤
d∑
i=1
σ2i β¯i.
Together with (5.18), it follows that the strategy ϕ is optimal in the frictionless market with risky
asset S˜. Since, by definition of S˜i and Lemma 5.9, the strategy ϕ only purchases resp. sells shares
of the risky asset i when S˜i = Si resp. S˜i = (1 − ε)Si, the process S˜ is a shadow price. It then
follows as in the proof of Proposition 5.10 that the same strategy is also optimal with the same
equivalent annuity in the original market with transaction costs, completing the proof.
5.3 Trading volume
As above, let ϕt = ϕ
↑
t − ϕ↓t denote the number of risky units at time t, written as the difference
of the cumulated numbers of shares bought resp. sold until t. Relative turnover, defined as the
measure S˜td‖ϕ‖t/S˜tϕt = d‖ϕ‖t/ϕt = dϕ↑t /|ϕt| + dϕ↓t /|ϕt|, is a scale-invariant indicator of trading
volume, compare Lo and Wang (2000). The long-term average relative turnover is defined as
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
d‖ϕ‖t
|ϕt| .
Similarly, absolute turnover (1−ε)Stdϕ↓t+Stdϕ↑t is defined as the amount of wealth traded, evaluated
in terms of the bid price (1− ε)St when selling resp. in terms of the ask price St when buying. As
above, the long-term average absolute turnover is then defined as
lim
T→∞
1
T
(∫ T
0
(1− ε)Stdϕ↓t +
∫ T
0
Stdϕ
↑
t
)
.
These quantities can be expressed in terms of the long-run averages of the local times L and U :
Proposition 5.11. The long-term average relative turnover is
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
d‖ϕ‖t
|ϕt| = limT→∞
UT
T
+ lim
T→∞
LT
T
.
The long-term average absolute turnover is
lim
T→∞
1
T
(∫ T
0
(1− ε)Stdϕ↓t +
∫ T
0
Stdϕ
↑
t
)
=
µ¯+ λ¯
α
lim
T→∞
UT
T
+
µ¯− λ¯
α
lim
T→∞
LT
T
.
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Proof. The formula for the relative turnover follows form the representation for dϕ/ϕ in Lemma 5.9.
The formulas for the absolute turnover follow analogously by noting that Stϕt = (µ¯− λ¯)/α on the
set {Υt = 0} where L increases, and likewise (1 − ε)Stϕt = (µ¯ + λ¯)/α on the set {Υt = log(u/l)}
where U increases.
Using the long-term limits of the local times L and U determined in GGMKS, Lemma D.2, it
follows that the long-run averages of the local times admit explicit formulas in terms of the gap λ¯.
These in turn yield the asymptotic expansions for ε ↓ 0 stated in Theorem 2.3 via Taylor expansion.
5.4 Connection to constant relative risk aversion
Finally, we prove Theorem 3.1, which states that all relevant quantities, i.e., liquidity premium,
optimal policy, equivalent annuity, and trading volume, for an investor with constant absolute risk
aversion arise in the limit for increasing constant relative risk aversion.
To this end it suffices to show that the gap of (GGMKS, Lemma B.2) for relative risk aversion
γ converges to its counterpart in our Lemma 5.2 for constant absolute risk aversion α, as γ ↑ ∞.
Note that this convergence holds for any level of absolute risk aversion, since our gap is independent
of the latter.
Theorem 5.12. As the relative risk aversion γ in (GGMKS, Lemma B.2) tends to infinity, their
gap λ¯γ converges to our counterpart λ¯ in Lemma 5.2, which is the gap for all levels α of absolute
risk aversion.
Proof. For small ε, the gap13 λ¯γ of GGMKS is given by the unique root of the function
fγ(λ¯) = γwγ(λ¯, log[uγ(λ¯)/lγ(λ¯)])− (µ¯+ λ¯),
where the function wγ is given explicitly in GGMKS, Lemma B.1. Now note that as the relative
risk aversion γ becomes large, Case 2 of GGMKS, Lemma B.1 applies if µ¯ > 1/4 and Case 3 applies
if µ¯ ≤ 1/4. By inspection of the explicit formulas in GGMKS, Lemma B.1 resp. our Lemma 5.1, it
follows that, as γ ↑ ∞, the function γwγ(·) converges uniformly on compacts to w from our Lemma
5.1. Since the same holds for the functions uγ(·), lγ(·) from GGMKS, Lemma B.2 and u(·), l(·) from
our Lemma 5.2, this in turn yields that fγ(·) converges uniformly on compacts to
f(λ¯) = w(λ¯, log[u(λ¯)/l(λ¯)])− (µ¯+ λ¯).
Since our gap λ¯ is the unique root of this function, it suffices to show that the zeros of fγ also
converge as γ ↑ ∞. But this follows, because a calculation shows that, for small ε, the derivative
∂
∂λ¯
f is bounded away from zero in a neighborhood of the root of f , completing the proof.
The convergence of all other – suitably rescaled – quantities follows immediately from the
explicit formulas in GGMKS and in this paper.
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